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4.

JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section
78-2-2 (j), Utah Code 1987-1988.
5.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

The appeal was brought by the defendant pursuant to
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rule 3(a). The State of
Utah brought a forfeiture action in the Third Judicial District
Court of Utah in an in rem proceeding against nine thousand one
hundred and ninety nine dollars, U.S. currency, one pager and
one Smith & Wesson gun on February 19, 1988.

A trial was held

before the Honorable James S. Sawaya on September 9, 1988.

On

October 13, 1988, an order was entered granting the state
forfeiture against all defendants.
6.
1.

THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

When did the state's interest in the defendant

currency vest?
2.

Is the state entitled to forfeiture by a

preponderance of the evidence?
3.

Can forfeitable funds be used to pay attorney's

fees?
7.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE

The interpretation of Utah Code, Section 58-37-13,
(1988) is determinative and is set forth as an addendum to this
brief.
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8.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case was brought by the state pursuant to a
violation of the controlled substances act by Charles Goodson,
The state initiated proceedings on February 19, 1988.

Four

attempts at service were unsuccessful at four different
addresses.

On April 1, 1988, service was perfected at the Salt

Lake County Jail.

Charles Goodson failed to respond to the

notice and complaint and default was entered on May 2, 1988.
Charles Goodson1s default was set aside, he filed an
answer and counterclaimed against the state.

On June 3, 1988,

the state filed an answer to Charles Goodson's counterclaim.
On June 13, 1988, Judge James S. Sawaya heard summary judgment
arguments made by both parties.

On June 20, 1988, Judge Sawaya

denied both motions.
On July 13, 1988, plaintiff made a motion to amend its
complaint and noticed it for August 1, 1988.

At the request of

the defendant, the motion was continued until August 8, 1988
when it could be heard with defendant's motion to dismiss.
Judge Sawaya was out of town August 8th and heard the motions
on August 22, 1988.

Both motions were denied.

Trial was set

for September 9, 1988.
On September 9, 1988, Judge Sawaya took the matter
under advisement and on September 13, 1988, ordered the
defendant property forfeited to the State of Utah.

-2-

Judgment

was entered on October 13, 1988.
On January 7, 1988, the Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office was executing a search warrant at 1545 S. Green Street
Apartment 2.
address.

(R.4-5).

(R.5).

Charles Goodson was present at that

Charles Goodson was seated leaning over a

coffee table where cocaine was located and a propane torch was
going with a cocaine bomb over it.
was arrested and searched.

(R.6-7).

Charles Goodson

(R.9).

Located on Charles Goodson1s person was the defendant
currency and cocaine.

(R.10).

Charles Goodson requested to

have one final hit off the pipe before being transported to
jail and offered to show the detectives how to cook cocaine.
(R.ll).
A loaded gun and beeper were confiscated.

(R.12).

The gun was located underneath Mr. Goodsonfs left side and the
beeper from the coffee table Mr. Goodson was seated at.
9.

(R.12).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Procedural matters are directory not mandatory.
Failure to set this for trial within 20 days of the answer
should not be grounds for a dismissal.

The defendant filed

counterclaims and motions which delayed setting this matter for
trial.

There is no evidence that this case was not given

priority by the trial judge.

In fact, Judge Sawaya heard both

counsel on various matters before trial.
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This case was

resolved as early as the calendar would permit.
The search of Charles Goodson's person was proper.

He

was arrested for committing a public offense in the presence of
a peace officer.

The search was no more intrusive than

necessary and the officer was lawfully on the premises where
the arrest took place.
Property that is used or intended for use in violation
of Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 (1988) is forfeitable to the
State of Utah to be disposed of in accordance with that
statute.
vests.

At the time of the illegal use, the state's title
This vesting precludes a subsequent transfer of the

property to any person for any purpose.
At trial, the evidence clearly showed that the funds
in question were used or intended for use to violate the
controlled substances act.

The state relied upon the

rebuttable presumption afforded to it and the burden was upon
the claimant to come forward with credible evidence.

The trier

of fact ruled that the claimant failed to come forward and
ruled that by a preponderance of evidence the state was
entitled to forfeiture.
The state's title to the seized items vested at the
time of the illegal act.

The property itself is tainted upon

the commission of the offense and any attempted transfer is
null and void.

To allow otherwise would encourage violators to
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transfer their title and effectively put the tainted property
out of the reach of the state.
Forfeitable items may not be used to pay for attorney
fees.

Allowing a claimant to use illegally obtained funds to

pay for attorney fees would be allowing him to profit from his
wrongs.
gone.

Any incentive to end the illegal behavior would be
Also, it does not violate a right to choice of counsel.

This action is a civil proceeding.

Mr. Goodson could have

obtained counsel that he could afford if he wished to have an
attorney represent him in this matter.
10.
I.

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT

PROCEDURAL MATTERS ARE DIRECTORY NOT MANDATORY

Section 58-37-13 (8) (g) of the Utah Code provides that
"when an answer to a complaint or petition appears of record at
the end of twenty (20) days, the court shall set the matter for
hearing within twenty (20) days."

The language of the statute

is clearly directory and not mandatory.
Generally, where procedural steps are enumerated in a
statute, they are construed liberally to permit the case to
proceed on its merits.

The Supreme Court of Idaho, when

addressing the very same issue in interpreting the Idaho
Controlled Substances Act, stated as follows:
Where the prescribed procedure is not
the essence of the thing to be
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accomplished the statute is generally
considered directory and not mandatory.
A contrary conclusion would be
disruptive to an orderly administration
of justice and would impair the
flexibility the trial courts must have
in setting cases for trial. In the
absence of a showing of substantial
prejudice the complaint should not be
dismissed merely because it was not
given priority over other civil cases,
if in fact such priority was not given.
State v. 1955 Willys, 595 P.2d 299f 303
(Id. 1979) .
The Supreme Court of Utah in State v. 1983 Pontiac,
717 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Utah 1986) stated as follows:

"The fact

that the hearing was not set within twenty (20) days was
clearly a fact that the court could consider in disposing of
the petition."
A review of the file in this case shows that there has
been no unnecessary delay and any delay that the defendant
perceives was caused by the defendant.

There is no allegation

that the matter was not set as early as Judge Sawaya's calendar
would allow.
The affidavits filed in support of the motion to
dismiss indicate that the alleged unavailable witness left the
jurisdiction as early as July 7, 1988.
of Motion to Dismiss).

(Affidavit in Support

This would have been a mere twenty four

days from the filing of the final verified answer in this case
and eighteen days from the summary judgment order.
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Therefore,

defendant's argument that the hearing was not held within the
twenty-day provision of the statute is clearly not grounds for
a dismissal in this case.
II.

THE STATE'S INTEREST IN THE DEFENDANT CURRENCY
VESTED AT THE TIME OF THE ILLEGAL ACT

Richard Leedy, the attorney for the defendant
property, claims that the currency was assigned to him for
attorney's fees.

(R.17).

Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 is clear:
"The following are subject to
forfeiture, and no property right exists
in them . . . everything of value
furnished or intended to be furnished in
exchange for a controlled substance in
violation of this act, all proceeds
traceable to any violation of this act,
and all moneys, negotiable instruments,
and securities used or intended to be
used to facilitate any violation of this
act."
A civil forfeiture proceeding is an in rem action
against property.
wrong.

The property itself has committed the

Because the property is considered tainted upon the

commission of the wrongful act, the interest of the government
vests at the time of the act.
1486 (10th Cir. 1988).

U.S. v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485,

"Illegal use immediately vests title to

the property in the sovereign, and cuts off the rights of third
parties to obtain legally protectable interests in the
property."

U.S. v. $41,305.00 In Currency and Traveler's

Checks, 802 F.2d 1339, 1346 (11th Cir. 1986).

Therefore,

Charles Goodson had no interest to assign,
III.

SEIZED PROPERTY iMAY NOT BE USED
FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

The Tenth Circuit specifically held in U.S. v. Nichols,
841 F.2d at 1505 that "allowing a defendant to use illegally
obtained assets to hire an attorney would adversely affect an
important public interest.

There is a public interest in

stripping defendants of the economic power they derive from
illegal activity and part of that undeserved power may be the
ability to command high priced legal talent."

That court

further held that civil forfeiture does not violate the right
to choice of counsel.
IV.

U.S. v. Nicholsy id at 1509.

CHARLES GOODSON WAS SEARCHED
PURSUANT TO AN ARREST

The Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office was executing a
warrant at 1545 S. Green Street in Salt Lake County.
The officers were legally on the premises.

(R.4-5).

Upon entering,

Charles Goodson was found leaning over a lighted propane torch
which was cooking cocaine.
arrested.

(R.9).

(R.6-7).

Charles Goodson was

It is clear that a peace officer may make an

arrest without a warrant when any public offense is committed
in his presence or he has reasonable cause to believe a felony
has been committed and the person arrested is believed to have
committed it.

Utah Code, Section 77-7-3 (1988).
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It is clear that Charles Goodson was committing a
public offense in the presence of Kendra Herlin, a peace
officer of the state.
(R.7).

(R.4, 7 ) . He was smoking cocaine.

A person may be searched incident to an arrest.

An

individual in custody may be searched without a warrant to
determine whether that individual has a weapon or possesses
evidence which may be concealed or destroyed.

The scope of

such search incident to arrest is to insure against destruction
of evidence and to protect an officer from harm.
Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986).

State v.

Therefore, the search of

Charles Goodson was proper.
V.

CHARLES GOODSON FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION
THAT THE DEFENDANT PROPERTY WAS DRUG RELATED
The search of Charles Goodson yielded cocaine and

$9,199.00 from his pockets (R.10).
table in front of him.

(R.12).

A beeper was located on the

Underneath the left side of

Charles Goodson, a loaded .44 magnum was seized.

(R.10).

Code, Section 58-37-13 (1988) provides that:
"everything of value furnished or
intended to be furnished in exchange for
a controlled substance in violation of
this act, all proceeds traceable to any
violation of this act, and all moneys,
negotiable instruments, and securities
used or intended to be used to
facilitate any violation of this act;
but:
*

*

*

there is a rebuttable presumption that
all money, coins, and currency found in
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Utah

proximity to forfeitable controlled
substances, drug manufacturing or
distributing paraphernalia, or to
forfeitable records of the importation,
manufacture, or distribution of
controlled substances are forfeitable
under this section; the burden of proof
is upon claimants of the property to
rebut this presumption."
The record clearly indicates that the money seized was
in proximity to cocaine.

(R.10).

The burden was upon the

defendant to come forward with credible evidence to rebut the
presumption of forfeiture.

In Re Indian Trail Trunk Sewer v.

City of Spokane, 670 P.2d 675, 677 (Wash. App. 1983).
Charles Goodson alleged that the $7,500.00 was won in
Wendover, gambling.

(R.15).

Judge Sawaya found that Charles

Goodson1s testimony was not credible.
Conclusions of Law, P.3).

(Findings of Fact and

"Where the evidence is in conflict,

we defer to the trial court's first-hand assessment of the
witnesses' credibility and assume that the trial court believed
those aspects of the evidence which support its findings."

Hal

Taylor Associates v. Union America, 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah
1982) .
The gun was seized pursuant to Utah Code, Section
58-37-13 (1) (i) which provides that property used for protecting
a controlled substance is forfeitable.

The forfeiture of the

gun was not contested at trial and its forfeiture is not
contested in this appeal.
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The defendant beeper was seized from the coffee table
directly in front of Charles Goodson.

(R.12).

The seizure was

proper pursuant to Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 (1) (b) which
provides for forfeiture of equipment used for delivering a
controlled substance.

The forfeiture of the beeper is not

disputed.
The record clearly demonstrates that all the defendant
items are subject to seizure and forfeiture to the State of
Utah.

The trial court's decision is supported by the record,

Utah law and case law.
VI.

RICHARD LEEDYfS TESTIMONY WAS IMPROPER

Richard Leedy should not have been allowed to testify
in the trial of this matter after the objection raised by the
state's counsel.

(R.22-28).

Rule 3.7 of the Rules of

Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer from acting as advocate
and witness unless he meets one of the exceptions.

Richard

Leedy did not claim he fell into any enumerated exception.
(R.22-28).
Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 (9) (h) provides that
"proceedings of this section are independent of any other
proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under this act or the
laws of this state."

Emphasis added.

Mr. Leedy1s testimony

alleged that Howard Lemcke agreed to return the currency in
exchange for a plea by Charles Goodson on criminal charges.
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(R.24).

If in fact an agreement existed, which the trial court

did not find, then it was null and void.
11,

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the State of Utah,
respectfully requests that this court affirm the decision of
the trial court allowing the forfeiture of the defendant
currency,
DATED this

Q> \

day of March, 1989.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

RENA BARBIERO
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Respondent
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12,

ADDENDUM

A.

Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 (1988) et: seq,

B.

Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss.

C.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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with federal and other state agencies in discharging
their responsibilities concerning traffic in controlled
substances and in suppressing the abuse of controlled
substances. To this end, they are authorized to:
(a) Arrange for the exchange of information
between governmental officials concerning the
use and abuse of dangerous substances.
(b) Co-ordinate and co-operate in training programs in controlled substance law enforcement
at the local and state levels.
(c) Co-operate with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Utah Bureau of Investigation by establishing a centralized unit which will receive, catalog, file, and collect statistics, including records of drug-dependent persons and other controlled substance law
offenders within the state, and make the information available for federal, state, and local law
enforcement purposes.
(d) Conduct programs of eradication aimed at
destroying the wild or illicit growth of plant species from which controlled substances may be extracted.
1971

58-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture — Seizure — Procedure.
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture, and no
property right exists in them:
(a) all controlled substances which have been
manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this act:
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment
of any kind used, or intended for use. in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance in
violation of this act;
<c) ail property used or intended for use as a
container for property described in vSubsections
ilXa) and (l)<b>:
fd) ail hypodermic needles, syringes, and other
paraphernalia, not including capsules used with
health food supplements and herbs, used or intended for use to administer controlled substances in violation of this act:
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described in Subsections <lMa)
or (1Kb), except that:
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a
common carrier in the transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited under this section unless it appears
that the owner or other person in charge of
the conveyance was a consenting party or
privy to violation of this act:
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason of any act or omission committed or omitted without the
owner's knowledge or consent; and
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject
to a bona fide security interest is subject to
the interest of a secured party who could not
have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would or did take
place in the use of the conveyance;
(f) all books, records, and research, including
formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data used or .intended for use in violation of this act;
(g) everything of value furnished or intended
to be furnished in exchange for a controlled sub-

58-37-13

stance in violation of this act, all proceeds traceable to any violation of this act. and all moneys,
negotiable instruments, and securities used or
intended to be used to facilitate any violation of
this act; but:
(i) An interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the holder of
the interest did not know of the act which
made the property subject to forfeiture, or
did not willingly consent to the act;
(ii) There is a rebuttable presumption that
all money, coins, and currency found in proximity to forfeitable controlled substances,
drug manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia, or to forfeitable records of the importation, manufacture, or distribution of
controlled substances are forfeitable under
this section; the burden of proof is upon
claimants of the property to rebut this presumption;
(h) ail imitation controlled substances as defined in the Imitation Controlled Substances Act;
and
<i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real property of any kind
used, or intended for use. in producing, cultivating, warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled substances in violation
of this chapter, except that:
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or interest in real
property is subject to the bona fide security
interest of a party who could not have known
in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a
violation would take place on the property;
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the holder of
the interest did not know of the act which
made the property subject to forfeiture, or
did not willingly consent to the act:
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing,
or storage facility or interest in real property
may not be forfeited under this section unless cumulative sales of controlled substances on the property within a two-month
period total or exceed $1,000, or the street
value of any controlled substances found on
the premises at any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experienced
in controlled substances law enforcement
may testify to establish the street value of
the controlled substances for purposes of this
subsection.
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this act
may be seized by any peace officer of this state upon
process issued by any court having jurisdiction over
the property. However, seizure without process may
be made when:
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or
search under a search warrant or an inspection
under an administrative inspection warrant;
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in
a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this act;
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is directly or indirectly
dangerous to health or safety; or

58-37-13
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(d) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has been used or intended
to be used in violation of this act.
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2),
proceedings under Subsection (4) shall be instituted
promptly.
(4) Property taken or detained under this section is
not repleviable but is in custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the
orders and decrees of the court or the official having
jurisdiction. When property is seized under this act
the appropriate person or agency may:
(a) place the property under seal;
(b) remove the property to a place designated
by it or the warrant under which it was seized; or
(c) take custody of the property and remove it
to an appropriate location for disposition in accordance with law.
(5) All substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred, distributed, or offered for distribution in violation of this act are contraband and
shall be seized and summarily forfeited to the state.
Similarly, all substances listed in Schedule I which
are seized or come into the possession of the state are
contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the
state if the owners are unknown.
(6) All species of plants from which controlled substances in Schedules I and II are derived which have
been planted or cultivated in violation of this act, or
of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or
are wild growths, may be seized and summarily forfeited to the state.
(7) Failure, upon demand by the department or its
authorized agent, of any person in occupancy or in
control of land or premises upon which species of
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an appropriate license or proof that he is the holder of a
license, is authority for the seizure and forfeiture of
the plants.
(8) When any property is forfeited under this act
by a finding of the court that no person is entitled to
recover the property, it shall be deposited in the custody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all
property is as follows:
(a) The state may include in its complaint
seeking forfeiture, a request that the seizing
agency be awarded the property. Upon a finding
that the seizing agency is able to use the forfeited
property in the enforcement of controlled substances laws, the district court having jurisdiction over the case shall award the property to the
seizing agency. The seizing agency shall pay to
the prosecuting agency the legal costs incurred in
filing and pursuing the forfeiture action. Property forfeited under this section may not be applied by the court to costs or fines assessed
against any defendant in the case.
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no application, any state agency, bureau, county, or municipality, which demonstrates a need for specific
property or classes of property subject to forfeiture shall be given the property for use in enforcement of controlled substances laws upon the
payment of costs to the county attorney for legal
costs for filing and pursuing the forfeiture and
upon application for the property to the director
of the Division of Finance. The application shall
clearly set forth the need for the property and the
use to which the property will be put.
(c) The director of the Division of Finance
shall review all applications for property submitted under Subsection (8Kb) and, if the seizing
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agency makes no application, make a determination based on necessity and advisability as to
final disposition and shall notify the designated
applicant or seizing agency, where no application
is made, who may obtain the property upon payment of all costs to the appropriate department.
The Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse
the prosecuting agency or agencies for costs of
filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to
exceed the amount of the net proceeds received
for the sale of the property. Any proceeds remaining after payment shall be returned to the seizing agency or agencies.
(d) If no disposition is made upon an application under Subsection (8)(a) or (b), the director of
the Division of Finance shall dispose of the property by public bidding or where deemed appropriate, by destruction. Proof of destruction shall be
upon oath of two officers or employees of the department having charge of the property, and verified by the director of the department or his designated agent.
(9) When any property is subject to forfeiture, a
determination for forfeiture to the state shall be
made as follows:
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation
shall be prepared by the county attorney where
the property was seized or is to be seized and filed
in the district court. The complaint shall describe
with reasonable particularity:
(i) the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known;
and
liii) the allegations which constitute a basis for forfeiture.
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the
district court shall forthwith issue a warrant for
seizure of the property which is the subject matter of the action and deliver it to the sheriff for
service, unless the property has previously been
seized without a warrant, under Subsection
58-37-13(2).
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the county clerk, and
served together with a copy of the complaint,
upon all persons known to die county attorney to
have a claim in the property by one of the following methods:
(i) upon each claimant whose name and
address is known, at the last known address
of the claimant, or upon each owner whose
right, title, or interest is of record in the Division of Motor Vehicles, by mailing a copy
of the notice and complaint by certified mail
to the address given upon the records of the
division, which service is deemed complete
even though the mail is refused or cannot be
forwarded; and
(ii) upon all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but who are believed
to have an interest in the property, by one
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the seizure was
made.
(d) Except under Subsection (8)(c), any claimant or interested party shall file with the court a
verified answer to the complaint within 20 days
after service has been obtained.
(e) When property is seized under this act, any
interested person or claimant of the property,
prior to being served with a complaint under this
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section, may file a petition in the district court
for release of his interest in the property. The
petition shall specify the claimant's interest in
the property and his right to have it released. A
copy shall be served upon the county attorney in
the county of the seizure, who shall answer the
petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not
answer a complaint of forfeiture.
(f) After 20 days following service of a complaint or petition for release, the court shall examine the record and if no answer is on file, the
court shall allow the complainant or petitioner
an opportunity to present evidence in support of
his claim and order forfeiture or release of the
property as the court determines. If the county
attorney has not filed an answer to a petition for
release and the court determines from the evidence that the petitioner is not entitled to recovery of the property, it shall enter an order directing the county attorney to answer the petition
within ten days. If no answer is filed within that
period, the court shall order the release of the
property to the petitioner entitled to receive it.
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition
appears of record at the end of 20 days, the court
shall set the matter for hearing within 20 days.
At this hearing all interested parties may
present evidence of their rights of release of the
property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The court shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the case and
order forfeiture or release of the property as it
determines.
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent
of any other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under this act or the laws of this state.
(i) When the court determines that claimants
have no right in the property in whole or in part,
it shall declare the property to be forfeited and
direct it to be delivered to the custody of the Division of Finance. The division shall dispose of the
property under Subsection (8).
(j) When the court determines that property,
in whole or in part, is not subject to forfeiture, it
shall order release of the property to the proper
claimant. If the court determines that the property is subject to forfeiture and release in part, it
shall order partial release and partial forfeiture.
When the property cannot be divided for partial
forfeiture and release, the court shall order it
sold and the proceeds distributed:
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants;
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure, storage of the property, legal costs of filing and pursuing the
forfeiture, and costs of sale; and
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for
the General Fund,
(k) In a proceeding under this section where
forfeiture is declared, in whole or in part, the
court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture proceeding, including seizure and storage of the
property, against the individual or individuals
whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and
may assess costs against any other claimant or
claimants to the property as appropriate.
1987
58-37-14. Resort for illegal use or possession of
controlled substances deemed common nuisance — District court power
to suppress and enjoin.

58-37-17

(1) Any store, shop, warehouse, dwelling house,
building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place to
which users or possessors of any controlled substances, listed in schedules I through V, resort or
where use or possession of any substances violates
this act, or which is used for illegal keeping, storing,
or selling any substances listed as controlled substances in schedules I through V shall be deemed a
common nuisance. No person shall open, keep, or
maintain any such place.
(2) The district court has the power to make any
order necessary or reasonable to suppress any nuisance and to enjoin any person or persons from doing
any act calculated to cause, or permit the continuation of a nuisance.
1971
58-37-15.

Burden of proof in proceedings on violations — Enforcement officers exempt from liability.

(1) It is not necessary for the state to negate any
exemption or exception set forth in this act in any
complaint, information, indictment or other pleading
or trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this act,
and the burden of proof of any exemption or exception
is upon the person claiming its benefit.
(2) In absence of proof that a person is the duly
authorized holder of an appropriate license, registration, order form, or prescription issued under this act,
he shall be presumed not to be the holder of a license,
registration, order form, or prescription, and the burden of proof is upon him to rebut the presumption.
(3) No liability shall be imposed upon any duly authorized state or federal officer engaged in the enforcement of this act who is engaged in the enforcement of any law, municipal ordinance, or regulation
relating to controlled substances.
1971
58-37-16.

P o w e r s to order testimony of witn e s s e s or production of e v i d e n c e —
Immunity of witness compelled to testify.
If the prosecuting attorney or attorney general of
the state of Utah determines that the testimony of
any witness or the production of any book, paper, or
other evidence by any witness before a grand jury or
court of the state of Utah involving any violation of
this chapter is necessary, he shall make application
to the court that the witness be instructed to testify
or produce evidence subject to the provisions of this
section and upon order of the court the witness shall
not be excused from testifying or producing books,
papers, or other evidence on the ground t h a t the testimony or evidence may tend to incriminate him or
subject him to forfeiture. No witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning
which he is compelled to testify after having claimed
his privilege against self-incrimination or produce evidence nor shall any such evidence be used in any
criminal proceeding against him in any court except
prosecutions described in this section. No witness is
exempt under this section from prosecution for perjury or contempt committed while giving testimony
or producing evidence under compulsion.
1971
58-37-17.

Judicial review.

(1) Any person aggrieved by a department's final
order may obtain judicial review.
(2) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings is in the district court of Salt Lake
County.
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Richard J. Leedy
Attorney for Plaintiff
230 East 3rd South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 359-1767
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THE STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.
NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
AND NINETY-NINE DOLLARS,
UNITED STATES CURRENCY,
ONE PAGER SERIAL #0701843,
AND ONE 4" SMITH AND WESSON
4 4 MAGNUM GUN MODEL 29,
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Defendant.

Honorable James S. Sawava

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
ss.
)

Charles Goodsen, being first put on his oath, deposes
and says:
1.

That I am an interested party;

2.

That my prior girlfriend was Lisa Martinez.

3.

She accompanied me on the day prior to seizure to

Wendover, Nevada, where I won most of the money seized from in
this matter.
She could corroborate my testimony regarding the

source of the money seized in this matter being non-cocaine
related.

2wmm

'tn~

COUNTY ATTORNEY
GOVERNMENT SERVICES

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

4.

W
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5.

Lisa Martinez was also the girl who delivered the

Stipulation to Howard Lemcke in this matter.
6.

She would dispute Mr. Lemckefs testimony that he

ask her if the Stipulation involved the $60.00 which was in his
possession the second time I was arrested rather than the
approximate $10,000.00 which was on me the first time I was
arrested.
7.

She would, in fact, testify that Lemcke "asked her

if I had $10,000.00 on me the second time I was arrested like the
first time and she responded no, I had $60.00.
8.

Approximately two to three weeks ago, Lisa Martinez

moved to Wisconsin; I have contacted her and she is unwilling to
come to Salt Lake City to testify in my behalf and even if she
were, neither she nor I have the fuads/to

CHARLES "SOODSEN
Subscribed and sworn to before me this (7^^
July,

day of

1988

Itta

My Commission Expires:

AAM

Notary Public
RestdLl"^
Residing in: / ../ww> , /tw„ . „\J
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
RENA BARBIERO #5033
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street, S-3400
Salt Lake City, Utah
84190-1200
Telephone:
468-3421
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

>

FINDINGS OF FACTS

)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

AND
V 0

NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
AND NINETY NINE DOLLARS,
UNITED STATES CURRENCY,
ONE PAGER SERIAL #0701843,
AND ONE 4" SMITH AND WESSON
44 MAGNUM GUN MODEL 29,

]
Case No. C88-1078
]
>

Defendant.
Trial
9th

day

of

was

Judge James S. Sawaya

]

held

on

September,

the

1988

above-captioned

before

the

case

Honorable

on

the

James

S.

Sawaya, District Court Judge,
Plaintiff,
Barbiero,

Deputy

State
Salt

of

Lake

Utah,

was

County

was represented by Richard J. Leedy.

represented

Attorney.

The

by

Rena

claimant

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Civil No. C88-1078
Page two

The parties presented evidence and argument to the
Court and the Court having fully considered the same now
makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1.

That jurisdiction is appropriate and this matter

is properly before the court.
2.
above, was

That on January 7, 1988 the property described
seized

to-wit:

$9,199.00

in cash, cocaine a

loaded 44 Magnum gun and pager were found upon and seized
from Charles Goodson.
3.

That

Charles

Goodson

purported

to

assign

to

Richard Leedy the monies seized on January 10, 1988.
4.

That

Deputy

Salt

Lake

County

Howard

Lemcke

purportedly stipulated to release an unstated sum of money.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Wherefore,

having

made

the

foregoing

Findings

of

Fact, the Court now makes, adopts and enters the following:
1.

The $9,199.00, gun, and pager is properly before

this court as items subject to forfeiture
Utah Code Annotated, 58-37-13 (1987).

as defined by

Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
Civil No. C88-1078
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2.

Charles

Goodson

was

in

possession

in

close

of

the

defendant property.
3.
controlled

The

money

seized

substances,

was

raising

a

proximity

rebuttable

to

presumption

that it is forfeitable.
4.
in

Charles Goodson did not meet his burden of proof

overcoming

the

States

presumption

by

clear

and

convincing evidence that the money was not drug related.
5.

The State's

right to the money vested at the

time of seizure and any subsequent transfer or assisgnment
of the money was null and void.
6.

The

gun

was

used

to

protect

a

controlled

substance.
7.

The pager was used to facilitate a violation of

the Controlled Substances Act.
8.

The forfeiture of the claimiant's property is

granted.
9.

That the Salt Lake County Attorney is entitled

to $1,380.00 to be paid by the Salt Lake County Sheriff's
Office for costs incurred in pursuing said forfeiture.

Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
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Let Judgment be entered accordingly:
Done in open COUJirt this

f

' Zs day of (0

ft

1988
BY THE COUR
/

^JAMES S. SAWAYA
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

ATTEST
H. DIXON h'lfc

;

zv

Approved as to form:
->- s\ ;

/^
:y 'w, . *

Richard J. Leedy
2241/

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
)

County of Salt Lake

RENA BARBIERO, being duly sworn, states that she is
the attorney for Respondent State of Utah and that she served
four (4) copies of the Brief of Respondent State of Utah upon
Richard J. Leedy, Attorney for Appellant, 245 Vine Street,
Suite 302, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103, by delivering true
copies thereof, on the

o I day of March, 1989.

RENA BARBIERO
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Respondent

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

*3/<o?f-

day of

iMarch, 1989.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in the State of Utah
My commission expires:
November 23-;—1990
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